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Social Christianity and the Constitution 
of a New Political Subject
CĂTĂLIN-VALENTIN RAIU
The methodological approach of this paper is inspired by Michel Foucault’s work 
on power and subject. He has seen the political power as a mode of action on actions, 
meaning that the essence of power is to be found not in institutions or individuals, 
but in the deep structures of the society because the power relations are rooted in the 
whole network of social bonds. While the foucauldian approach is due to make us 
understand the nature of the political subject, we are also using a discourse analysis 
in order to explore the thought of the western Social Christians mainly in the late 
nineteenth-century France.
Likewise we are using the view of theologian John Milbank on liberalism1 as 
a political philosophy which does not have in its very heart the true nature of the 
human person, but an invented abstract individual, pure material, asocial, whose own 
nature is broken from God’s creation. The classic liberal ideal was that of a human 
being lacking its traditions and faith, who just wants for the seek of wanting because 
he is the owner of a free will and not the receiver of the gift of God. So, liberalism is 
very unnatural, which means that both the social contract and the social order are in 
need for a social christian reflection superior to the liberal discourse of rights or the 
primacy of the will2.
The Ambivalence of The Subject
Although the concept of ”political subject” is one of the most important issues 
in political science, very few political scientists tried to use and define it3. There is no 
operational or straightforward definition of the concept. Based on the current state of 
knowledge we will try in the following rows to understand its centrality in the realm 
of political theory and philosophy, as well to see if the social Christian movement had 
tried to change the political subject of the modernity.
Before John Locke, it is impossible to speak about the human beings as political 
subjects, excepting the divine sovereigns. The dignity of our self-concern as human 
subjects, knowing and knowable beings, coexists with the condition as individuals 
whose conduct and normality is subject to constant supervision. The forms of power 
that are applicable on daily basis are those which turn individuals into subjects. For 
this reason we need to have in mind the ambivalence of the English term subject used 
1 John MILBANK, Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1993, pp. 9-26. 
2 IDEM, ”The Gift of Ruling”, in John MILBANK, Simon OLIVER (eds.), The Radical 
Orthodoxy Reader, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London/New York, 2009, p. 339. 
3 Daniel BARBU, ”Critica comunismului românesc. O lectură teologico-politică”, Studia 
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. X, no. 4, 2010, p. 628.
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for two different political concepts. The term reveals its ambivalence in Latin language 
as subjectum means the author of an action while subjectus means someone ruled by 
the sovereign1. So, we do have two meanings of the subject: subject to someone else 
by control and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Moreover, 
both meanings are linked and suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes 
subjects to.
While in the political regimes based on kingly and divine sovereignty, the king 
is the only political subject, the discourse of rights and specially the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant have created a new political subject which is the citizen as being the 
embodiment of the rights and of the operation of practical reason. Actually, in the 
political arrangement of the rights and duties determined by the state 
”the subject is considered a citizen to the extent he or she embodies the general 
will, in which case the only laws worthy of the name are those framed to reflect 
the united will of the whole nation”2.
The political scientist William Connolly argues that in the contemporary political 
and social framework dominated by market discipline and democratic virtue, the 
liberal political subject has lost its freedom and it is under a sever disciplinary 
control: 
 ”The contemporary imperative to generate economic growth under adverse 
conditions of realization intensifies pressures to extend disciplinary control into 
new corners of life [...] The idea of slack, serving as a counterpoint to the logic of 
disciplinary control, itself stands in an ambiguous relation to radical and liberal 
doctrines. Echoes from an earlier liberalism reverberate within it. The classical 
liberal doctrine – in its support for constitutionalism, human rights, fallibilism, 
privacy and the market as invisible coordinator of economic life – sought to 
protect the self from close dependence on state power and to restrict the space 
for political contestation. But while the doctrine of constitutionalism retains its 
importance, several other institutions and economic priorities in which liberalism 
place its faith have become enlisted today as vehicles of disciplinary control”3. 
Apart from the critique of contemporary economical and political order, William 
Connolly shows that the so-called ”turn to the subject” is related with the rise of 
modernity and a phenomenon which lies at the center of liberalism and constructed 
on the centrality of the will and the loss of transcendence. Following the Cartesian idea 
of subjectivity, in which case the subject is transparent to himself, being rational aware 
1 G. GUŢU, Dicţionar latin-român, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1983, 
p. 1166. 
2 Kenneth SURIN, ”Rewriting the Ontological Script of Liberation: On the Question of 
Finding a New Kind of Political Subject”, in Creston DAVIS, John MILBANK, Slavoj ŽIŽEK 
(eds.), Theology and the Political. The New Debate, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 
2005, p. 243. 
3 William CONNOLLY, ”Discipline, Politics, Ambiguity”, in Tracy B. STRONG (ed.), 
The Self and the Political Order, New York University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 157-158. 
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of his own thoughts, interests and motivations1, the Citizen Subject was ”the ideal 
of the political system of the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries”2. The extension 
of universal suffrage was also linked to new methods of government based on new 
styles of classification and calculation, meaning new forms of subjecthood.
The political scientist William Connolly provide us with definitions on what 
political subject means. The subject is
”a claimant of rights within it, an independent center of knowledge and a bearer 
of socially established criteria of knowledge, a seeker of self-transparency and a 
interiorizer of social norms. This ambiguity is its essence; but its denial is crucial 
to its identity”3. 
And:
 ”The modern subject carries around too much rancor4 against that in 
itself which resists subjectivity and that in others which deviates from its 
standards”5. 
Thus, the subject is both free and an agent of freedom, a freedom which can be 
lost if the subject deviates from the conditions surrounding the privilege because 
political liberalism 
”it is founded on the presupposition of a rational, autonomous and right-bearing 
bourgeois subject, one who has been liberated from the shackles of aristocratic 
privilege and may now express this freedom in the public sphere”6.
Classical liberalism may be seen as a logic that has regulated the individual’s 
relationship with the state, cutting out the complex intricacies of feudal relationship 
– tithes, guilds, communes and so on – and allowing a more direct and absolute 
connection with the state7. This means that citizenship has become a mode of 
subjectivity based on obedience and devotion to the state following its direction 
through liberation of the bourgeoisie subject from the aristocratic hands and may now 
express and act itself freely within the public sphere. Yet, some categories of citizens 
cannot live up to bourgeois norms (proletarian, prostitutes, paupers, etc.) so they are 
excluded. If we seen socialism as another version of liberalism, as Max Stirner puts it8, 
then social liberalism (socialism) is to be understood as the extension of the principle 
of equality to the economic and social realm:
1 Saul NEWMAN, Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought. New Theories of the Political, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2005, pp. 118-119. 
2 Kenneth SURIN, ”Rewriting the Ontological Script of Liberation…cit.”, p. 247. 
3 William E. CONNOLLY, Political Theory & Modernity, Cornel University Press, Ithaca 
and London, 1993, p. 156. 
4 The American spelling of ”rancour”. 
5 William E. CONNOLLY, Political Theory…cit., p. 158. 
6 Saul NEWMAN, Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought…cit., p. 16. 
7 Ibidem, p. 17. 
8 Max STIRNER, The Ego and Its Own, Cambridge University Press, ed. by David Leopold, 
third printing, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 105-110.
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 ”In political liberalism – which is ostensibly a discourse of rights that 
guarantees the individual freedom from political oppression – the individual 
is constituted as a subject of the state. In the discourse of social liberalism, the 
individual is tied to external collective arrangements through a subjection to the 
idea of society”1. 
Social liberalism demands that the principle of equality should be extended to the 
economic and social domain. This can only be achieved by the restriction of private 
property, which means that for socialism
”society itself becomes a new locus of sovereignty and domination, rather then 
the liberal state”2. 
As opposing both liberalism and socialism seen as caught in materialism, the 
Social Christianity movement was in search for a new political subject. The Social 
Christian thought observes that the new kind of political power developed since the 
sixteenth century, the state, tends to ignore the traditional communities and is looking 
only at the hole society, or a class or a group3. Welfare is shifted into a bereaucracy that 
rends its beneficiaries more susceptible to disciplinary control, which makes Michel 
Foucault to understand the the normalized modern self as the one that maintains self-
surveillance to avoid treatment for delinquency, mental illness, etc. Thus, the modern 
self is a locus of disciplinary normalization. A power relationship involves that ”the 
other” (the one whom power is exercised) 
”is recognized and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; and that, 
faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results 
and possible inventions may open up”4.
Foucault’s words describe both the way and the methods used by Social Christians 
at the end of the nineteenth century to fulfill the status of the liberal citizen with the 
human dignity based on Christian teachings. As Michel Foucault puts it, liberty is 
the precondition of power relations. This means that, for example, slavery is not a 
relation of power:
 ”Power is exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free. 
By this we mean individuals or collective subjects who are faced with a field 
of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and 
modes of behavior are available”5. 
Foucault starts to study the historical constitution of the subject as an object for 
himself by taking into account the procedures by which the subject observe, analyze 
1 Saul NEWMAN, Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought…cit., p. 21. 
2 Ibidem, p. 19. 
3 Michel FOUCAULT, ”The Subject and Power ”, in James D. FAUBION (ed.), Power. 
Essential Works of Foucault. 1954-1984, vol. 3, transl. by Robert Hurley and others, Penguin 
Books, London, 2002, p. 333. 
4 Ibidem, p. 340. 
5 Ibidem, p. 342. 
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and recognize himself as a domain of knowledge. Rooted in the Enlightment the 
modern man tries to invent himself as an autonomous subject who exercise or submit 
to power relations. In his work on the history of sexuality the French philosopher 
describes sexuality not as a natural given, but as a deployment of power linked to 
the body, something historically constructed and produced through the strategies 
of power-knowledge. Thus from the seventeenth century onwards the sovereign’s 
power was replaced by ”anatomo-politics of the human body” which is in fact a 
disciplinary power due to turn individuals into subjects of knowledge and of power. 
Therefore subjectivity is constructed through various discourses, practices, regulative 
codes and institutions1. For example, sexuality is a kind of regime of power which 
does not operates just at the level of discourse, it is also institutional – based though 
the practice of confession. For Foucault the subject is constituted both by discursive 
and institutional practices.
 ”Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species 
in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an 
individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified and a space in 
which they could be disturbed in an optimal manner. For the first time in history, 
no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence [...] Power 
would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate 
dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to 
exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself”2. 
Political subjects are thus to be constituted on two bases: 
 ”Starting in the seventeenth century [...] the disciplines of the body and 
the regulations of the population constitued the two poles around which the 
organization of power ower life was deployed [...] the bio-power was without 
question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter 
would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinary of production”3. 
We can sum up the Foucauldian approach of the political subject as a body 
which is self-empowered, but also a locus of disciplinary normalization, a free, 
knowing, willing and autonomous agent who is in the same time obeyed to the power 
exercised upon himself and compelled to act under certain conditions for its own 
self-empowerment. Our definition is only a methodological one, as we do not find in 
Foucault’s work a straightforward definition. Moreover
1 Christopher NORRIS, ”What is Enlightment?: Kant and Foucault”, in Gary GUTTING 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, 
p. 160. 
2 Michel FOUCAULT, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (translation of 
La Volonté de savoir), transl. from French by Robert Hurley, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, 
pp. 142-143. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 139-141. 
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”the individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the 
extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual 
which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle”1,
being also involved in a different manner in the realms of his existence:
 ”We do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute 
yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a meeting or when 
you are seeking to fulfill your desires in a sexual relationship”2.
In the late nineteenth-century context, the social Christian intellectuals observed 
that just the bourgeois citizen was a political subject while the socialists and 
syndicalists wanted that the working class should have been the political subject. 
In our understanding, the political subject is a human body who is constituted by 
power, but at the same time can resist that power and act contrary to that power. 
The citizen is the the subject at the level of politics3, but the attempt of Social 
Christianity was to prove that the individual could have not been pure individualistic 
or some insignificant atom of the hole society, but a human person with specific 
Christian goals in Haven, as well on earth. Rejecting both liberalism and socialism, as 
well as their political subject – the citizen and the society dominated by the working 
class – the Social Christian thinkers designed a new political subject starting with the 
questions: What kind of spaces or opportunities are necessery to conserve the liberty 
of the human person as understood in Christianity?
Social Christianity
This paper refers in a very particular way at Social Christianity as the socio-
political thought and movement from the late nineteenth-century and the beginning 
of the twentieth century developed mainly in countries like France and Austria, but 
also in Belgium, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany or Romania. It is also understood 
by the scholars as being one of the forerunners of Christian Democracy4. What we 
are interested in is the intellectual core of this socio-political thought and not in the 
historical development or the political achivements of a movement that in spite of its 
lack of visibility, has had tens of millions of adherents, journals, reviews, conferences, 
representative in the legislative in many European countries including Romania. 
Inaugurated by René de Chateaubriand in his work Génie du Christianisme 
whereby he meant to prove the historic role of Christianity in Western civilization, the 
1 Robert E. GOODIN, Philip PETTIT (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, 
second edition, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Cornwall, 2006, p. 544.
2 Michel FOUCAULT, ”The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom”, 
in Paul RABINOW (ed.), Ethics. Essential Works of Foucault. 1954-1984, vol. I, Penguin Books, 
London, 2000, pp. 290-291. 
3 William E. CONNOLLY, Politics and Ambiguity, The University of Wisconsin Press, 
Wisconsin/London, 1987, p. 111. 
4 Ronald Eckford Mill IRVING, The Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe, 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs George Allen & Unwin, London, 1979, p. 22-31.
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awakening of the Christian conscience was to be born again by restoring the confidence 
of Catholics in their own allegiance. The purpose of the book was to create a new 
sensibility, as the very obscurities of Christianity are to be preferred to the lucidities of 
the so-called age of Reason1 promoted by the French Revolution. Furthermore, liberal 
Catholicism of Felicite de Lammenais2 or René de Montalembert are considered as 
forerunners of the late nineteenth-century Social Christian movement as they have 
opened the door to new political ideas into the counter-revolutionary mainstream 
promoted by the Catholic Church3. 
In spite of these remarkable figures, we can not speak about Social Christianity 
before 1871 when two prisoners in the Franco-Prussian war, Count Albert de Mun 
(1841-1914) and Count René de la Tour du Pin (1834-1925) dedicated themselves to 
the social Catholic cause and along with Léon Harmel the three of them could be 
considered the fathers of Social Christianity regarding theory and practice as well. 
While de Mun and his collaborators intended to avoid mere paternalism and the 
patronizing attitude that had been too characteristic of the conservative Catholics, 
they were all the same apostles of the Counter-Revolution, and they were royalists 
who were opposed to the republican regime. De la Tour du Pin refused to abandon 
his royalism even when in 1890s Pope Leo XIII directed the French Catholics to rally 
to the Republic. They created a workingmen’s club consisting not of industrial or 
agricultural workers as in trade unions, but of shop assistants, caretakers, vergers 
and so on.
 ”It was in this context that social Catholicism developed among left-wing 
Catholics in France after 1871, though the work of Albert de Mun and the 
Marquis de la Tour du Pin. Catholic trade unions were developed […] the aim 
of social Catholicism was to direct […] the economic life of society as to allow 
Christian morality to exercise a beneficent effect, so mitigating the worst effects 
of egoistic competition”4. 
They resisted attacking the liberal principles and looked back to Ancien Régime 
conceptions of economic organization (Albert de Mun), while others like Léon 
Harmel and De la Tour du Pin proposed a corporatist vision on society. They set up 
a mixed unions of employers and workers whose task would have been to apply the 
Christian principles. Social Catholicism remained opposed to socialism, as Albert de 
Mun pointed out that the later is the enemy of Catholicism being atheist and negating 
private property. 
Albert du Mun and La Tour du Pin had studied the German social catholic 
doctrine, while being war prisoners at Aix-la-Chapelle5. Albert de Mun entered politics 
as a candidate for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies with a clerical and counter-
1 François René de CHATEAUBRIAND, Génie du christianisme, 2 vol., chronologie et 
introduction par Pierre REBOUL, Garnier-Flammarion, Paris, 1966, passim. 
2 Bernard REARDON, Liberalism and Tradition. Aspects of Catholic Thought in Nineteenth-
Century France, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/London/New York/Melbourne, 
1975, pp. 62-112. 
3 A.R. VIDLER, A Century of Social Catholicism. 1820-1920, SPCK, London, 1964, pp. ix-xii.
4 Eric CAHM, Politics and Society in Contemporary France (1789-1971). A Documentary 
History, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London/Toronto/Wellington/Sydney, 1972, p. 606. 
5 John MCMANNERS, Church and State in France, 1870-1914, SPCK, London, 1972, p. 81. 
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revolutionary platform. He tried to explain the need of restoring the monarchy, as a 
means of reconciling paternal authority with genuine liberty. As a deputy, Albert de 
Mun often created alliances with the socialists concerning anti-liberal policies. He 
insisted for a eight-hours working day, the right of workers to create associations, the 
responsibility of employers for work accidents. If de Mun was the orator of this social 
group, La Tour du Pin was the intellectual leader1 and the one that led the movement 
towards corporatism2. In his reflections, he contrasted the individualism of liberal 
capitalism which had left every man in the hand of the law of supply and demand 
with the pre-revolutionary guilds or corporations. He believed in an alternative to 
both laissez-faire and socialism. Léon Harmel (1829-1915) went even further than 
de Mun and Tour du Pin, both in theory and practice, as he invented a system in 
which the workers were co-partners in industry developing ”a Catholic industrial 
democracy”, his formula being that the workers should
”be achieved by themselves so far as possible, never without them and a fortiori 
never in spite of them”3. 
His root principle was co-partnership, not patronage. Following Rerum novarum’s 
teachings and impetus, lots of priests, journalists and orators took up the cause of the 
workers attacking the capitalist system.While in France the liberal economists were 
arguing against any legislative protection of the working class, the social Catholic 
ones have supported a minimum wage, social legislation and a modernized guild 
system. Even if Catholics as Le Play or Charles Périn attacked economic liberalism, 
they still were supporters of economic freedom4. Their strategy was to implement the 
reform within the existing social order, rather that against it. 
Therefore Social Christian thought was concentrated on a modernized guild 
system as an alternative to state socialism. Because labor must not be regarded as 
a commodity, they sustained trade unionism and enacted legislation against child 
labor, establishing a social insurance system. The principle of association was the first 
article of their program, inspired by the abolished medieval craft guilds. Industry 
should take the form of a
 ”Catholic guild, which is neither a trade union, nor a tribunal of arbitration, 
but a center of Christian activity where the interest of the profession is superior 
to private interest, where antagonism between capitalist and workingmen gives 
way to patronage exercised in a Christian spirit and freely accepted”5. 
1 Marquis René DE LA TOUR DU PIN, Vers un ordre social chrétien: jalons de route, 1882-
1907, Gabriel Beauchiane, Paris, 1929. 
2 Chantal MILLON-DELSOL, Statul subsidiar, trad. de Maria Petruţ, Efes, Cluj-Napoca, 
2000, pp. 216-217. 
3 A.R.VIDLER, A Century of Social Catholicism...cit., p. 124. 
4 Nicolae T. BUZEA, Socialismul şi creştinismul social, Tipografia Eparhială ”Cartea 
Românească”, Chişinău, 1926, pp. 248-275.
5 Albert de MUN, speech at Chartres, September 8, 1878; cf. L’Association catholique, 
vol. VI, pp. 587-593, apud Parker Thomas MOON, The Labor Problem and The Social Catholic 
Movement in France. A Study in the History of Social Politics, The Macmillan Company, New York, 
1921, p. 99. 
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Albert de Mun’s understanding of the guild system was also based on the 
principle of association. The modernized guilt should be a community formed among 
employers and workingmen of the same profession, held together and with common 
duties as common possession, voluntary sacrifice and corporate property. His view 
of trade unions as syndicats mixtes should be empowered to establish collective funds, 
insurance against sickness or unemployment and so on. Therefore they were meant 
to be not just substitutes for medieval guilds, but tools of removing ”the antagonism 
between capital and labor”1. We can sum up his social and political thought under 
three heads: social insurance (a pension after retirement of the workers and social 
insurance in case of accidents, sickness and unemployment), labor organization and 
legislation. All these things shouldn’t have been placed under the state’s bureaucracy 
and duty which have meant state socialism, but the social funds should have been 
managed by a board of trustees representing both the employers and the workers 
themselves2. As a constitutional reform they asked mainly through the voice of De la 
Tour du Pin for a vocational senate as a complement of the existing parliament based 
on political representation. Nevertheless they were divided in opinions concerning 
republicanism or private property.
The one that also put into practice these social ideas was the rich industrialist 
Léon Harmel: ”What Harmel had achieved in fact, – the reorganization of industry on 
a Christian basis, – de Mun was demanding in theory”3. He based his factory on three 
principles: association, democratic control and capitalist paternalism. These elements 
were combined and balanced in a mixt trade union run by a Guild Board and based 
on Christian charity. The textbook written by Léon Harmel4 at the request of Albert 
de Mun and De la Tour du Pin laid down the label of paternal care (paternité) for the 
workers. Harmel insisted that the guild should be primarily religious and moral, he 
wanted to reconcile capitalism and Christianity. 
Within his industrial park from Val-de-Bois there were living the happiest French 
workers of those times as they had had their own banks, medical care, family subsidies, 
social insurances, education for their children, etc. As for him, philanthropy by itself 
was never able to cover up the social problems, he always tried to make the workers 
understand that they needed to have their own organizations5. In 1884, when the 
trade unions were legalized in France, Harmel started to promote the idea of mixt 
unions consisting of both employers and workers6. 
In politics, Albert de Mun was a bitter believer of state’s interventionism in 
helping the workers. Simultaneous, La Tour du Pin, the intellectual leader of the 
movement insisted for a decent wage enough to feed a family, the unemployment 
insurance and other kinds of financial support. He exposes these ideas at The Fribourg 
Union, where the laissez-faire it is also denied from 1885 onwards. Following this, the 
state interventionism gained ground among Social Christians. De la Tour du Pin’s 
corporatism was conceived as a revival in modern terms of the medieval guilds, 
1 Parker Thomas MOON, The Labor Problem…cit., p. 104. 
2 Ibidem, p. 112. 
3 Ibidem, p. 117. 
4 Léon HARMEL, Manuel d’une corporation chrétienne, Tours, 1876, passim. 
5 John MCMANNERS, Church and State…cit., p. 84. 
6 On Harmel’s work: Joseph B. GREMILLION, The Catholic Movement of Employers and 
Managers, Gregorian&Biblical Bookshop, 1961, pp. 24-37. 
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where the state was representing the economic interests of each group or community1. 
We can sum up the core of Social Christianity as consisting of the realism of Léon 
Harmel, the leadership of Albert de Mun, the thought of De La Tour du Pin and also 
the politics of Pope Leo XIII. Becoming a political movement, it has also changed its 
core from charity to justice2. 
Rerum novarum also known as Magna Charta of Social Catholicism3 helped to 
lay down the foundations for the economic doctrine of corporatism which became 
popular in the 1920s and which sought to achieve a harmony between social groups 
by the rejection of both individualistic liberalism and conflictual syndicalism. In these 
senses, Pope Leo XIII was not a liberal, but a conservative. His encyclicals encouraged 
Social Catholics to go further with their battle againstpoverty and deprivation. In 
France the initiatives of Social Catholics took up his principles and had many and 
varied practical initiatives. Albert de Mun established Cercles Catholiques d’ouvries in 
1871, a social study group which reached 60 000 members in 1906, belonging to 418 
worker’s societies4. Later on, Marc Sangnier set up Le Sillon (The Furrow) an youth 
movement for debating the worker’s problems. In Germany long before Rerum 
novarum, the bishop of Mainz, Emanuel von Kettler, also encouraged Catholics 
to form their own associations. Austrian Social Catholicism was also preeminent, 
helped by Karl von Vogelsang who campaigned for the introduction of welfare 
measures and against child labor. Fr. le Play, De La Tour du Pin and Vogelsang 
were mainly rejecting democracy, as they were having a more paternalistic approach 
towards state’s duties. They articulated an organicist conception of society, arguing 
that men could achieve spiritual and political fulfillment only through membership 
of a wider community as family, professional guilds and so on. It was in fact 
an authoritarian and corporatist outlook making the success of these Catholic 
associations quite limited because, as Albert du Mun puts it – they were organized 
by elites (de l’extérieur5), not by the workers.  He also described the Church as a 
mediatrix between the strong and the weak, but his belonging to this far tradition 
of natural rights along with his anti-republicanism made him not very influential 
on the French political scene mainly because their clericalism was antinomic with 
secular republicanism6.
1 John MCMANNERS, Church and State…cit., p. 86. 
2 Ibidem, p. 93. 
3 Nicholas ATKIN, Franck TALLETT, Priests, Prelates and People. A History of European 
Catholicism since 1750, I.B. Tauris, London/New York, 2003, p. 174. 
4 Ibidem, p. 175. 
5 J. McMILLAN, ”France”, in Tom BUCHANAN, Martin CONWAY (eds.), Political 
Catholicism in Europe, 1918-1965, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 34-68.
6 Miriam COHEN, Michael HANAGAN, ”Politics, Industrialization and Citizenship: 
Unemployment Policy in England, France and United States, 1890-1950”, in Charles TILLY 
(ed.), Citizenship, Identity and Social History, Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 
Cambridge/New York/Melbourne, 1996, p. 117.
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The Sociology of Guild
The Social Christians were ardent believers in the private property as an inviolable 
and intangible right1, as they were asking for the sharing of capitalist property by 
both the owners and workers using the natural right theory. The limits of private 
property are those revealed by God, which means that first of all the rich should help 
the poor and serve the common good2. Concerning labor, the wage should be ”just” 
and reflect the social status of the worker, conferring enough access to food, clothes, 
a roof for him and his family. In order to benefit of all these, the worker needs to 
afford to save some money for the times while sick or unemployed. Again, the Social 
Christian solution is not necessarily the state, but the corporations including both the 
workers as well the owners3. 
For De la Tour du Pin the Social Christian justice seemed impossible ”while 
missing the solidarity ties between people4. The guild brings together all those who 
work in the same professional branch. The guilds were called corp d’état5, as they were 
designed to be semi-autonomous from the state, but part of the same as a guarantor 
of the social and economic consensus of the society6. In the political realm it needed 
a political representation based on vocation and social function as the truth and the 
justice couldn’t have been created through the ballot box. The state of Tour du Pin, as 
”the congregation of power of the nation organized for the common good, which is 
the national interest”7, should have been governed as a monarchy under the corpus of 
the guild’s rights and with a nondemocratic political representation, but a corporatist 
one. By definition we cannot name a corporatist regime a democratic one because it 
is in the search for high purposes as national interest, not people’s demands.
The nineteenth century was dominated by the view that the principles of natural 
sciences were also applicable in society. So, the idea of a science of society (sociology) 
was born as the outcome of the belief that there existed laws governing social 
phenomena. Politics could be reduced to a impersonal body of principles and men 
would be governed by scientific truths. Even the main Romanian promoter of Social 
Christianity, the bishop Bartolomeu Stănescu called both politics and democracy 
sciences: 
 ”Democraţia este în primul rând ştiinţa solidă asupra lucrurilor din lume, 
pe care le orânduieşte prin legi; şi ştiinţa profundă asupra sufletului omenesc, 
ca legătură pe care legile o mijlocesc între om şi mediul său de viaţă, să-i dea 
cu putinţă sufletului şi puterilor omeneşti să domine acest mediu, iar nu să fie 
dominate de ele”8.
1 Peter J. WILLIAMSON, Varieties of Corporatism. A Conceptual Discussion, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge/London/New York/New Rochelle/Melbourne/Sydney, 1985, 
p. 30. 
2 Ibidem, pp. 32-33. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 34-35. 
4 Marquis René DE LA TOUR DU PIN, Vers un ordre social chrétien…cit., p. 117. 
5 Ibidem, p. 409. 
6 Ibidem, pp. 23-24, 183. 
7 Ibidem, p. 502. 
8 Vartolomeiu STĂNESCU, ”Discurs la legea financiară, rostit în şedinţa senatului dela 
10 februarie 1923”, in IDEM, Produsuri sufleteşti şi realităţi verificate, Tipografia Cozia, Râmnicul-
Vâlcea, 1934, p. 244.
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As Sheldon Wolin puts it, by the end of the nineteenth century, elites turned to 
society, as ”the source of a new mystique” and politics as an art was lacking interest1. 
Everything was society’s creation and even the highest human aspiration (religion, 
philosophy, etc.) were stripped of mystery and exposed as expressions of society. For 
people as Émile Durkeim, Joseph de Maistre and others upholders, society needs first 
of all authority and organization. But, it was not conservatives alone who held a deep 
faith in organization. Durkheim suggests a society based on professional groups or 
under the control of managerial elites who have the knowledge for maintaining the 
social equilibrium in an age of successive technological revolutions2. The nostalgia 
for the vanished simple community was both socialist and conservative. Saint-Simon 
invented a scientific religion because of the need for a foundation of common belief. 
By the end of the nineteenth century the social utility of religion has been expressed 
in a nostalgia for the values of the Middle Ages: 
 ”In his description of society ridden by anomie Durkheim provided his age 
with an up-to-date version of the Hobbesian state of nature: it was the same 
authorityless condition. Without effective moral control or legal controls […] the 
difference was an ironic one: where Hobbes men killed each other in the state of 
nature and finally forms civil society to halt the slaughter, Durkheim’s man finds 
life in society intolerable and is driven to kill himself. The obsession with anomie 
was rooted in the yearning for solidarity and nineteenth-century sociology its 
task to be that of redefining the conditions od social cohesion. Solidarity was a 
social fact, and thus could have been studied as an object”3.
Durkheim’s social theory also borrowed by the same bishop, Bartolomeu 
Stănescu4, was founded in opposition to the liberal view of society as an artificial 
arrangement arising from a social contract. 
 ”The big assumption that sociology accepted was that power and authority 
were natural because they were necessary to social solidarity”5. 
Without a stable society, an unquestioned authority, the bonds of family, vocational 
group, parish and so on, individuals will feel lost. So the people need structures. In 
some senses, Durkheim was as hostile towards liberalism as Marx because liberal 
society was abnormal considering the high rate of suicide and divorce indicated. There 
were also elements of philosophical liberalism in Durkheim’s thought as the defense 
of rights, the theory of freedom of mind and his moral and political individualism. 
He stresses the dignity of the individual, free thoughts, free democratic institutions, 
tolerance and pluralism. François Guizot’s liberalism was based on the property 
qualification on the basis of the franchise, the power should be limited to the middle 
1 Sheldon S. WOLIN, Politics and Vision. Continuity and Innovation in Western Political 
Thought, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1961, p. 361. 
2 Émile DURKHEIM, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, transl. by Cornelia Brookfield, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1992, pp. 14-64. 
3 Sheldon S. WOLIN, Politics and Vision…cit., p. 399. 
4 Bartolomeu Stănescu studied at Sorbonne with Emile Durkheim for B.A. and a PhD 
thesis in sociology having as coordinator the French sociologist from 1905 until 1912.
5 Sheldon S. WOLIN, Politics and Vision…cit., p. 400. 
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classes. He held that the revolutionary principle (the equality) of the Revolution was 
a great danger as inherited inequality and property inheritance were foundations of 
civil society. For the liberals of Durkheim’s time freedom was opposed to democracy 
and equality. He was not a true liberal, as the cry for social justice was specific to 
socialist at his time. Durkheim ‘s original thought can be seen in the political realm in 
his critique of liberalism, understood as laissez-faire and being full of contradictions, 
rather than supporting real individualism: 
 ”For Durkheim rights are real and positive and not just defensive and 
negative as they were for the liberals: solidarity creates a system of ’rights and 
duties’ not merely a forum of exchange”1. 
So the acknowledgement of the society as a system of rights and duties is central 
to moral individualism. For him the positive rights that the individuals acquire against 
the state are to be protected by secondary groups. Although socialism was synonymous 
with revolution, it had an ethical aspect as well: it was ethically by contrast with 
the corruption of the capitalism. The hole point of the science of sociology, as the 
way that elites were locking at the society, was during Social Christianity movement 
the need for finding the genuine social authority that offers protection, welfare and 
social security. This also explains the steady attachment of the Social Christians to 
monarchy. 
Whereas the Church had been associated traditionally with monarchy and 
authority, the Revolution set about introducing into French society both democracy 
and freedom. The French Catholics were divided since the nineteenth century into left 
and right wings. The right-wing Catholic attitude, which is our concern here, is based 
on the assumption that the teaching of the Church is imitable and that salvation is to 
be achieved only by obeying to Church rule. Thus, later on 
”the religious authoritarianism inherent in right-wing Catholicism has marked 
political authoritarianism. Emphasis is laid by right-wing Catholics on the 
traditional duty of Christians to obey the legitimate government in the civil 
sphere”2.
For them, the only legitimate form of government remained the monarchy. 
Nevertheless while some began to abandon the idea of monarchy after Rerum 
Novarum, very many right-wing Catholics in the twentieth century simply went over 
to other forms of political authoritarianism, notably the doctrines of Action Française 
and those of Vichy. Their opposition to socialism has always accompanied their 
opposition to democracy because of ”the fear of seeing the people enroll themselves 
under the red flag of the antichrist”3. 
The republican anticlericalism came to have a mythic and irrational dimension 
for the Social Christians. What kind of labels are ”clericalism” and ”anticlericalism” 
1 Susan STEDMAN JONES, Durkheim Reconsidered, Polity Press, Oxford and Malden, 
2001, p. 51. 
2 Eric CAHM, Politics and Society in Contemporary France (1789-1971)…cit., p. 605. 
3 Charles GIDE, Curs de economie politică, trad. de George Alexianu după ediţia a noua, 
vol. I, Editura Casei Şcoalelor, Bucureşti, 1927, p. 50. 
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in nineteenth-century France? The Church tried to promote the religion as a social 
phenomenon, not just as a matter of private conscience and individual acts of piety1. 
The Church claimed the right to be a public presence in the life of the nation and 
to reconstruct a Christian social order. Republicans on the other hand, as adepts of 
positivism and progress, were committed from 1860s onwards to a secular vision 
of society in which religion was meant to be a remnant of the feudal society. So, the 
republicans wanted a secular society and a secular state. Later on, attempts by Jacques 
Piou and Albert du Mun to launch a successful Christian Democratic party were 
discouraged by Rome and Marc Sangnier’s flourishing Catholic youth movement was 
condemned outright in 1910.
During the nineteenth century, hostility towards Christianity took the forms of 
positivism and materialism. Georges Goyau (1869-1939), another Social Christian, 
was convinced that French Catholicism needed to be awaken from its ancient dreams 
of monarchy and accept the republic2. Thus the Social Christianity as a movement was 
making its way very slowly as the process is impeded by the Church who had failed 
to understand  the times. 
A New Social Theology
The theologian John Milbank makes us understand the connection between late 
nineteenth-century sociology and Social Christianity: 
 ”In the wake of French Revolution, various Catholic thinkers denied the 
possibility of a secular politics on the grounds that politics had its basis in a 
’social’ order directly revealed or created by God. This conclusion was not at 
all an obscurantist and temporary interruption of the forward march of liberal 
enlightenment. On the contrary, it represented a new attempt to resolve the new 
antinomy encountered by secular social science – do humans construct society 
or does society construct humanity?”3. 
The new social theology introduced the divine providence into the political reality.
Robert Nisbet argues that sociology as a science has shared a common ideological 
ethos with the conservative Christian thinking of the nineteenth century, both of them 
having concerns with common faith, the importance of the education, the need for a 
spiritual and hierarchical power in order to maintain the cultural identity as well as 
the importance of intermediary associations and guilds4. The issue is that we have a 
sort of continuity from Bonald and Maistre to Comte and Durkheim, not in ideological 
terms, but in methods and metaphysics5. 
1 James F. McMILLAN, ”Religion and Politics in Nineteenth-Century France: Further 
Reflections on Why Catholics and Republicans Couldn’t Stand Each Other”, in Austen 
IVEREIGN (ed.), The Politics of Religion in an Age of Revival, Institute of Latin American Studies, 
London, 2000, p. 47. 
2 Georges GOYAU, Autour de catholicisme social, 5 vol., Perrin et Cie., Paris, 1897-1912, 
passim. 
3 John MILBANK, Theology and Social Theory…cit., p. 51. 
4 Robert NISBET, The Sociological Tradition, Heinemann, London, 1966, passim. 
5 John MILBANK, Theology and Social Theory…cit., p. 52. 
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The Social Christian conservatism seen as a new social theology very similar with 
the durkheimian sociology, both of them having at their very end the idea of a society 
organized on the principle of authority, meet each other in the intellectual process of 
the formation of a new political subject: the modernized guild. These were seen as the 
only groups able to offer some stability for modern society as the social and political 
malaise has the same origin, namely
”the lack of secondary cadres to interpose between the individual and the 
State […] these secondary groups are essential if the State is not to oppress the 
individual: they are also necessary if the State is to be free of the individual”1. 
Therefore we do have a sort of common ethos concerning the body that creates 
the power, it is also able to resist the power created and act contrary to it, meaning 
the Social Christian movement along with the new social theology born at the end of 
the nineteenth century have created, at least in a discursive manner, a new political 
subject. This was not the citizen as in the liberal thought, not the society dominated 
by the proletarian ethos as in the socialist thought, but the modernized guild – the 
only community able to render the human dignity. Later on, Social Christianity 
has dissolved into several directions, some of them democratic regimes (Christian 
Democracy) and some of them very authoritarian such as the interwar corporatist 
regime from Europe.
1 Émile DURKHEIM, Professional Ethics…cit., p. 96. 
